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Abstract
Both U.S. and European Air Transportation Systems
face substantial challenges in transforming to meet future
demand. This paper uses a feedback model to identify
and describe key issues in the dynamics of system transi-
tion, with particular emphasis on stakeholder cost-benefit
dynamics and processes for reviewing and implement-
ing new system capabilities. Understanding of these dy-
namics is further reinforced through discussion of ADS-B
and new runway construction examples. To implement
the significant changes currently envisioned for ATM sys-
tems, it will be critical to structure system changes to an-
ticipate and overcome stakeholder disagreements and im-
prove the efficiency of the approval and implementation
processes.
1 Introduction
The Air Transportation Systems in both the United States
and Europe are facing several substantial challenges.
Limited system capacity, in the face of continuously in-
creasing demand for travel, poses one of the largest chal-
lenges to the continued operation of the US system. Fu-
ture increases in traffic levels are projected to outstrip cur-
rent capacity in several key points of the system poten-
tially causing significant disruptions. In response to this
anticipated demand increase and other pressures, both the
U.S. Joint Planning and Development Office (JPDO) and
EU SESAR (Single European Sky ATM Research) pro-
grams are proposing ambitious modernization goals for
their respective domestic and international ATM systems.
These modernization efforts must take place while also
improving system safety and security, reducing environ-
mental emissions, and involving multiple stakeholders in
the decision process.
The purpose of this paper is to identify and discuss the
dynamics of air transportation system transition, in order
to understand the barriers to change that make such tran-
sitions difficult as well as the opportunities that exist to
make transitions successful. Once barriers and possible
leverage points are identified and understood, problems
during transition can be anticipated and strategies to miti-
gate their effect can be developed. The paper details why
barriers occur, where along the transition process they can
be expected, how they work, and what the implications
are. In addition, the paper identifies opportunities that ex-
ist for addressing such barriers. Understanding and an-
ticipating issues that may arise during transition is critical
to achieving the required increases in system performance
proposed by JPDO and SESAR to meet future demands.
Transition dynamics and barriers are discussed using a
model developed based on past cases of transition. While
the specific examples discussed derive from US experi-
ences, the general barriers and dynamics identified are
applicable both to US and European efforts to modernize
Air Traffic Management. Two examples of system im-
provements are used to illustrate specific aspects of sys-
tem transition. The examples were chosen because they
represent possible solutions for addressing capacity con-
cerns. Both are also examples of currently undergoing
or planned transitions in the US Air Transportation sys-
tem. The first example is Automatic Dependent Surveil-
lance Broadcast (ADS-B). ADS-B is an integrated set of
airborne and ground components that provide the posi-
tion of aircraft as a replacement or complement to radar-
based surveillance. The ADS-B datalink also enables the
receipt of information from other aircraft or the ground.
ADS-B is the pathfinder example for technology modern-
ization included in JPDO’s Next Generation Air Trans-
portation System [1]. The second example discussed
will be runway expansion, a crucial activity for expanding
airport capacity outlined in FAA’s Operational Evolution
Plan (OEP) [2].
2 Transition Model
In order to understand the barriers to transition in the air
transportation system a feedback model of transition is
used. The model, presented in Figure 1, was developed
based on 13 cases of historical transition efforts in the US
Air Transportation System. Cases studied include tech-
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nology and policy changes, successful and unsuccessful
changes, as well as safety and capacity driven changes.
The framework provided by the model is used to study
barriers caused by the multi-stakeholder nature of transi-
tion as well as those posed by the complexity of the im-
plementation process.
Figure 1. Transition Model
Boxes in the model represent high-level processes
while arrows represent the resulting states. The Air Trans-
portation System is represented as a process in the model,
the output of which is system behavior. These outputs are
monitored as part of the awareness building process. Dur-
ing the awareness building process, stakeholders (a stake-
holder is anyone with an interest in the outcome or in-
volved in the process of a transition) develop an under-
standing and definition of the problem and potential so-
lutions. Each stakeholder forms their own mental model
of the situation. This includes projecting future outcomes
based on potential actions to address the problem.
Once stakeholder awareness of a problem and potential
solutions exist, stakeholders engage in the change process.
During this process, stakeholders evaluate the projections
for the future and develop preferences based on the for-
mation of their individual objectives. While these prefer-
ences are determined separately for each stakeholder, they
can be modified as stakeholders act and interact during the
decision making process. The change process terminates
when an action to address an issue is selected, often by
the stakeholder with authoritative power.
Once an action is selected, it proceeds through the im-
plementation process. In this process, stakeholders allo-
cate money, refine the details of the solution, and approve
the chosen solutions. Once implementation is complete
and successful, the capability of the system is improved
and the problem being addressed is reduced or eliminated.
However, barriers to change can arise in multiple places in
the model and stall or even derail change efforts. In partic-
ular, the multi-stakeholder nature of the change process as
well as the complexities of implementation can pose bar-
riers to change. These barriers are captured in the nego-
tiation and solution refinement loops shown in the model
and discussed below.
The negotiation loop occurs during the change process
and captures the dynamics of decision selection in a situ-
ation with multiple stakeholders who have different agen-
das, value structures, and are effected differently by po-
tential changes to the system. During this process stake-
holders work to influence decision makers and interact
with others to determine if concessions and agreements
can be reached. Inability to overcome strong stakeholder
oppositions can contribute to long transition time con-
stants.
Barriers can also arise during the implementation pro-
cess. The complexities of determining the specifics of
a solution as well as conducting the necessary safety,
environmental, and other approval processes can delay
change. In addition, stakeholder disputes can once again
arise when details of a solution are being determined. Fi-
nally, the approval processes that occur during implemen-
tation can be deliberately used by stakeholders who are
negatively affected by a change but were unable to influ-
ence decision makers against its implementation.
Several key issues which arise during system transition
will be discussed in the context of the model in the fol-
lowing sections.
3 Stakeholder Objectives and Deci-
sion Making
3.1 Stakeholder Cost-Benefit Dynamics
The distribution of costs and benefits can have a signifi-
cant impact on the stakeholder dynamics during the pro-
cess of transition. Understanding and anticipating stake-
holder dynamics by analyzing the distribution of costs and
benefits to stakeholders is an important aspect of achiev-
ing successful transitions. Marais and Weigel [3] provide
a framework for discussing cost-benefit dynamics through
the utilization of cost-benefit matrices. This framework
can be expanded, as shown in Figure 2, to illustrate that
the distribution of costs and benefits is influenced by the
applications that stem from a proposed capability change
in the system.
As shown in the figure, a new system capability can
be decomposed into operating procedures, aircraft oper-
ational capability (i.e. equipage), ATC operational capa-
bility, and ground infrastructure changes. These capabil-
ities then enable new applications from which stakehold-
ers derive benefits. The new capabilities also need to be
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Figure 2. Transitioning from Capabilities to Benefits
financed. As a result, the benefits that can be achieved
come at a cost.
3.2 Decision Making
When an opportunity or need for system transition exists,
stakeholders determine their objectives based on how they
will be affected by different possible actions. Such value
analysis may be determined by a rigorous analysis of costs
and benefits or can be merely perceived by a stakeholder.
These objectives determine what a stakeholder wants to
accomplish during the change process shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Stakeholder Negotiation Loop
Engaging in the change process requires interaction and
negotiation between stakeholders to make a decision and
select an action. The ability of stakeholders to arrive suc-
cessfully at a decision depends not only on how much
disparity exists between the objectives of different stake-
holders, but also the relative power of each stakeholder
in influencing decision making. The process of transi-
tion can stall at any point during the negotiation loop, be-
cause stakeholders are unable to resolve their differences
on problem understanding, the correct action to address
the problem, or the details of how a selected action should
be implemented. However, successful transition can be
facilitated through incentives or other measures that better
distribute stakeholder benefits and costs. These measures
can be used during the negotiation loop to help accelerate
the change process and foster acceptance of a solution.
Stakeholder dynamics can also change throughout the
transition process. For example, the level of system
equipage can change the cost benefit structure for stake-
holders still deciding whether or not to equip. In addi-
tion, shocks to the system can cause stakeholder changes
in cost-benefit evaluations and in relative power. Major
accidents can highlight an underlying system deficiency
and generate sufficient public pressure to change. Many
safety technologies, such as TCAS and EGPWS, were im-
plemented to address problems highlighted by such acci-
dents.
In the following sections, the distribution of costs and
benefits as well as how that distribution influenced stake-
holder dynamics during the change process are discussed
for three example cases. Aggregate costs and benefits
of potential applications are discussed for the Capstone
ADS-B project and for runway expansion at Boston Lo-
gan International Airport, while detailed benefits by ap-
plication are discussed for ADS-B implementation in the
Gulf of Mexico.
3.3 Asymmetrical Cost and Benefit Distribu-
tion: The Case of Runway Construction
An example where differences in stakeholder preferences
impede change is in airport expansion. Many airports are
currently facing capacity constraints as well as increasing
demand, resulting in increased delays. As part of the FAA
Operational Evaluation Plan a number of these airports
are attempting to expand runway capacity by extending
or adding runways. However in many cases these projects
have been met with strong community opposition.
Applying the framework presented in Section 3.1, de-
creasing airport delays by increasing capacity would be
the new capability added by the transition. The applica-
tion that achieves this capability is a new runway or ex-
tended runway. The distribution of benefits and costs be-
tween different stakeholders are shown in Figure 4.
Relevant stakeholders include the airlines which oper-
ate at an airport in question, the local airport authority, the
flying public (specifically those who use the airport), com-
merce groups, local communities living around the air-
port and the groups representing them, local government,
and the FAA. The local government is not included in the
cost-benefit matrix because it is not directly impacted by
the construction of the runway, but acts indirectly in the
process. Local governments are lobbied by local commu-
nities, commerce groups, as well as port authorities and
airport users. They are also elected by members of all or
some of these groups and have a responsibility to repre-
sent their interests.
The reason for community opposition is apparent from
the cost-benefit distributions shown in Figure 4. Com-
munities perceive themselves as paying most of the non
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Figure 4. Perceived Aggregate Cost Benefit Matrices
for Airport Runway Expansion Projects
financial costs of the runway, such as increased noise
and pollution, while the benefits extend mostly to other
groups. Benefits to communities that result from airport
expansion are less clear. Strong air transportation is tied to
the economic health of regions and can induce economic
growth and development, but the effects are difficult to
measure and therefore are not apparent to communities as
a tangible benefit.
There have been successful cases of airport expansion
projects. In these cases the communities are often more
removed from the airport. In addition, interested par-
ties anticipate potential stakeholder opposition and mit-
igate the adverse effects to communities. In success-
ful examples, such as projects in Atlanta or St Louis,
the addition of a new runway can take about 10 years.
However, there are also cases such as Boston and Seattle
where community opposition is very difficult to overcome
and expansion projects can stall for as much as 30 years
even when mitigation measures such as sound proofing
are implemented and compromises on runway usage are
made [4, 5].
3.4 The Role of Incentives: ADS-B Capstone
Project
The Alaska Capstone project was an early demonstration
program for ADS-B capabilities, and today continues as
part of the current plans to implement ADS-B through-
out the NAS. Several factors make Alaska an ideal loca-
tion for demonstration projects, and ADS-B in particu-
lar. These factors include a lack of surveillance coverage
in some areas, remote and inhospitable terrain, and harsh
weather conditions [6]. Potential safety improvements,
combined with strong political support provided an oppor-
tunity to deploy and certify prototype ADS-B capabilities
early in the development lifecycle through the Capstone
project.
During Capstone, aircraft were voluntarily equipped
with an IFR certified GPS receiver, Multifunction Dis-
play, and associated ADS-B data-link and avionics, with
reimbursement from the FAA. At the same time, the
FAA worked with avionics manufacturers to support tech-
nological implementation of ADS-B avionics, deployed
ground-based transceivers (GBTs), and integrated ADS-
B reports into the air traffic control system. Specific ca-
pabilities provided in Capstone included the broadcast of
aircraft position to ATC, up-linked traffic, weather, and
aeronautical information (e.g. NOTAMs). The applica-
tions provided included surveillance outside of existing
radar coverage and increased onboard situation aware-
ness [7]. The aggregate benefits provided by these ap-
plications compared to the costs incurred are shown in
Figure 5. As a demonstration program, equipage was in-
centivized by the FAA who covered costs that would have
normally been borne by operators and avionics manufac-
turers. As a result, benefits were provided at little per-
ceived cost to the aircraft operators.
Figure 5. Aggregate Cost BenefitMatrices for the Cap-
stone Project in Alaska
The Capstone project in Alaska presented a case where
stakeholder alignment was achieved with the use of incen-
tives. Another effect of this alignment was a rapidly accel-
erated timetable for certification, procedure development,
and deployment of ADS-B capability. Capstone com-
ponents and procedures were certified and implemented
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rapidly, from initial definition and funding in 1999 to op-
erational capability in 2001 [7].
3.5 Temporal Evolution of Costs and Benefits:
ADS-B Deployment in the Gulf of Mexico
In some cases, costs and benefits of a set of enabled ap-
plications can change as the transition progresses, usually
through varying levels of equipage. The FAA is intro-
ducing ADS-B, GBTs, and services regionally, with the
Gulf of Mexico as one of the first locations. Deployment
in the Gulf of Mexico provides immediate benefits to op-
erators and the FAA due to the lack of radar coverage,
and an opportunity to place ground stations on oil plat-
forms already located in the Gulf [8]. Investigating the
planned deployment of ASD-B in the Gulf of Mexico pro-
vides a notional illustration of how benefit distributions
can change substantially with the rate of user equipage.
Matrices of application-level benefits by stakeholder for
ADS-B implementation in the Gulf region are presented
in Figures 6 and 7 for an assumed 1/3 (partial) equipage
state and full equipage respectively.
Figure 6. Application Benefits Matrix for Gulf of Mex-
ico (1/3 Equipage)
Figure 6 shows benefit levels to operators and the FAA
who are early adopters, assuming approximately 1/3 of to-
tal flights are ADS-B out equipped, but full ground infras-
tructure capability is present. These early adopters pri-
marily receive benefits when they comprise a large frac-
tion of the flights into and out of an airport (network carri-
ers with hub in region) or when applications are provided
proportional to fleet equipage (e.g. enhanced visual ac-
quisition, cockpit weather, fleet tracking). Specific to the
Gulf of Mexico, off-shore helicopter operators would ini-
tially benefit from fleet tracking and radar-like IFR sep-
aration applications. All operators could initially benefit
from enhanced visual acquisition of traffic, leading to in-
Figure 7. Application Benefits Matrix for Gulf of Mex-
ico (Full Equipage)
creased safety and possibly increased capacity in VFR and
MVFR conditions.
Figure 7 depicts the benefits to operators and the FAA
after full ground station implementation and operator
equipage. Most benefits are provided to all operators and
are realized since the critical mass has been met and all
ADS-B applications can be performed. The FAA realizes
few benefits are available until the critical mass is reached
and current procedural separation standards can be re-
placed with increased capacity through radar-like separa-
tion services. Because benefits to stakeholders increase
significantly as more operators equip, this example illus-
trates a strong case for using of incentives to accelerate
fleet equipage and gain full benefits as rapidly as possi-
ble.
4 Complexities of the Implementa-
tion Process
Once an action has been selected during the change pro-
cess, it needs to be implemented. The selected action is
often a broad commitment to a new technology or imple-
mented system and many steps still need to take place be-
fore implementation is complete. The complexities of the
safety and approval process, while necessary, can intro-
duce substantial delays into the transition process by ini-
tiating the solution refinement loop shown in Figure 8. A
critical aspect of achieving system transitions envisioned
in NGATS and SESAR will be the ability to obtain safety
and environmental approval for new capabilities. In par-
ticular, safety certification and approval poses a signifi-
cant risk in system transition. A high level abstraction of
the approval steps required for various aspects of system
capabilities is shown in Figure 9.
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Figure 8. Solution Refinement Process
4.1 Safety Review Processes
Once an overall concept of action exists, detailed plans
have to be made and carried out in the implementation
process. In fulfilling their commitment to public safety,
national regulatory authorities must ensure that the pro-
posed ATM system change can be accomplished at an ac-
ceptable level of safety. To provide this assurance, the
safety authorities carry out a variety of oversight functions
focused on several aspects of the proposed change. Fig-
ure 9 shows a simplified version of the approval process
that occurs during implementation.
An improvement in the operating performance of the
system can be decomposed as four basic areas: aircraft
operational capability, ground infrastructure, air traffic
control capability, and established operating procedures.
As an example, achieving ADS-B-based separation proce-
dures requires several supporting system capabilities: air-
borne equipage to enable ADS-B out, ADS-B ground sta-
tions to collect and rebroadcast ADS-B data and transmit
to ATC, air traffic control capability to receive and display
ADS-B traffic data, and defined separation procedures us-
ing ADS-B data are all necessary. The characteristics of
each of these components are defined by the system spec-
ification and definition and each separate component and
their interactions must be certified by the regulatory au-
thority as meeting safety requirements.
The changes envisioned by JPDO and SESAR for sys-
tem capabilities are broad in scope and involve changes in
multiple areas of the system, including avionics, ground
infrastructure, and the air/ground interface of data inte-
gration and operational procedures. To manage complex-
ities in the scope of change, regulatory authorities carry
out a variety of oversight functions based on a decompo-
sition of the system. Figure 9 shows the processes and
states broken down in this manner, with the ultimate goal
of achieving desired system capabilities in three basic ar-
eas: aircraft operational capabilities, air traffic control op-
erational capability, and established procedures.
In order to carry out the certification process, resources
must be allocated to be spent on analysis in different ar-
eas of the system. Within the FAA, the Air Traffic Or-
ganization is responsible for the performance of the air
traffic control system, while the Aviation Safety organi-
zation evaluates aircraft certification and changes to flight
and operating rules. In the safety analysis process, tech-
nical expertise is also often required from air traffic con-
trollers, aircraft operators, and other users of the system.
This review process can often take a substantial amount
of resources and effort and require numerous iterations of
system capabilities and requirements. A large amount of
analysis may be necessary in order to sufficiently prove
that a system meets required safety performance, and in
many cases limited operational implementations are used
to understand safety consequences.
The two previous ADS-B examples discussed in this
paper showed stakeholder cost-benefit dynamics in lim-
ited deployment of ADS-B technology. Each implemen-
tation is also an example of the opportunity to identify
and understand potential operational safety issues from
experience. The Capstone program initiated the technical
definition of ADS-B and related service delivery archi-
tecture. Because of its status as a demonstration program,
and other accelerating factors, the system approval, avion-
ics development, and implementation proceeded rapidly.
Safety review processes were begun in 1999 and opera-
tions with ADS-B commenced in Alaska in 2001 [7].
Early deployments provide an opportunity to gather
data on the efficacy of the system, to mature technology,
and to understand safety risks that were not anticipated in
earlier review and analysis. This approach manages the
complexity of implementation by controlling conditions
in a limited environment and involving fewer stakehold-
ers in the decision-making process. Similarly, the deploy-
ment of ADS-B in the Gulf of Mexico will provide an op-
portunity to attempt implementation at a smaller scale and
learn about possible issues that may arise during a larger
scale deployment. However, before ADS-B benefits can
be fully realized, there is a significant amount of anal-
ysis that must still be performed to ensure safety under
the conditions of system-wide implementation. Some of
this analysis is likely to duplicate effort already performed
in evaluating the previous implementations. Transfer of
knowledge is crucial to eliminating such inefficiencies
and improving the implementation process.
The broad scope of change also requires significant co-
ordination across responsibilities within the regulatory au-
thority, which can require substantial resource investment.
Eliminating delays and improving efficiency is important
both to keep up with the rapid pace of technology devel-
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Figure 9. Highly Simplified Approval Processes Necessary for Improved Operational Capabilities
opment and to certify the large number of new operat-
ing capabilities required to increase capacity. This will
enable the implementation process to flow efficiently, so
that value can be delivered to multiple stakeholders in the
NAS.
4.2 The Environmental Review Process
In addition to the safety review process, the environmental
review process is necessary for runway and other infras-
tructure projects. This process exists in order to ensure
that projects do not pose too large a threat to the health
of surrounding communities and the global environment.
For any runway project, the environmental review pro-
cess takes place once the preliminary design is complete.
This includes the layout, costs, benefits, and possible al-
ternatives for the project. The first step of this process
is to conduct an environmental assessment to determine
if the project will have significant impact on noise, air
quality, water quality, or historical artifacts. If the answer
is no, and all state regulations have been met, a project
can proceed to acquire permits and than begin construc-
tion. However, if significant impacts are expected an En-
vironmental Impact Statement (EIS) must be prepared. A
notice of intent is first required, followed by a draft EIS
which is reviewed by interested stakeholders including the
public. Incorporating comments from the review process,
a final EIS is prepared and submitted for review. If the
statement is approved a record of decision is issued and
the project can proceed to permitting and construction [9].
The environmental review process can take several
years including time to prepare, review, and approve the
environmental impact statement. This can add a signifi-
cant amount of time to the overall transition process. In
addition, the EIS is often used by those opposing a runway
project as the object of litigation thereby further delaying
construction.
A study conducted by the General Accounting Office
surveyed the top 50 airports in the US. 92% of study
participants said that it was more difficult to balance en-
vionmental concerns with airport operations than it was in
1989. Noise was listed as the largest concern by 58% of
participants, followed by water quality listed by 24% of
participants, and local land and air issues listed by 16%.
88% of the participats stated that the environmental re-
view process contributed to delaying runway projects and
72% said that it was the primary cause of delay. The me-
dian time for an airport project amount the participating
airports was 10 years [10].
The FAA Operational Evaluation Plan (OEP) is a plan
to expand existing airports. Figure 10 shows the airports
with recent and current OEP projects as compared to the
top 30 most congested airports in the country. The figure
shows that only a small fraction of the airports that are
congested are attempting to expand capacity. This indi-
cates that more construction projects will be needed in the
future as demand continues to increase. However, with
lengthy construction times these projects may not be re-
alized in time to accommodate the growth rate. The fig-
ure includes both pending and completed projects and the
number of years since initiation. It can be seen that run-
way projects can take about 10 years to complete in the
best case and almost 30 years in the worst case.
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Figure 10. OEP Airport Projects
One way to help resolve stakeholder issues is to make
redesigning projects easier. Currently, the environmental
review process can pose a barrier to resolving stakeholder
conflicts when redesigning a construction project would
mean that the environmental approval process would have
to be redone, causing a delay. Methods for revising and
iterating on the design of runway projects, while main-
taining the validity of the environmental impact statement,
could be developed to make the process more efficient.
4.3 Stakeholder Differences during Implemen-
tation
During the implementation process, stakeholder issues re-
main important to the dynamics of change. Although
stakeholders may have agreed to an overall plan of action,
they also need to agree to the details of implementation
and their roles in it. Implementation requires making de-
tailed plans and schedules: technical issues need to be re-
solved, stakeholders need to agree on budgets and the dis-
tribution of costs, as well as timetables for development,
testing and implementation. Each of these actions can act
as a barrier to forward progress delaying or stalling the
transition process. The issues dealing with stakeholder
differences during the implementation process are cap-
tured in the refinement loop in Figure 8, which can be-
come a delay loop in the transition process.
In the case of ADS-B, stakeholder differences have
impacted the architecture of the broadcast communica-
tion standard. Three candidate technologies were ini-
tially considered to provide transmission and reception
of ADS data: Voice Data Link Mode 4 (VDL Mode-4),
1090 Extended Squitter (1090ES), and the Universal Ac-
cess Transceiver (UAT). After a cost-benefit analysis [11],
VDL Mode 4 was ruled out in cost and benefits, UAT was
shown to be less expensive for GA operations and offer
a higher bandwidth for uplink of graphical weather infor-
mation, and 1090ES was shown to be roughly equivalent
in performance but would be less expensive for air carriers
because they are already equipped with 1090-Mhz capa-
ble Mode S transponder. The final decision in the US was
to support ADS-B through both protocols. The decision
to support both protocols required the addition of a “Mul-
tiLink Gateway” to all ground stations so that UAT traffic
information is uplinked to 1090ES equipped aircraft and
1090ES traffic information is uplinked to UAT equipped
aircraft, eliminating the ability to perform air to air sepa-
ration applications without working ground stations. The
consequence of this decision is shown in Figure 11, in-
dicating the uncertainty in link equipage applicability for
medium-sized aircraft.
Figure 11. ADS-B Communication Standards [12]
In addition to choosing the link technology, choos-
ing a standard protocol on that link has been problem-
atic for stakeholders. The initial ADS-B system perfor-
mance standards (MASPS) were developed by RTCA as
DO-242. However, limitations and issues with this pro-
tocol were discovered. In particular, the way in which
GPS integrity and accuracy is characterized proved to be
an issue [13]. This led to DO-242A, a newer protocol
that resolves many of the problems found with the original
standard. However, avionics manufactures and operators
have been hesitant to implement the DO-242A standard in
equipment because of uncertainty in which standard the
FAA will support, or if stakeholders will revise the ADS-
B MASPS again in the future.
In addition to agreeing on the technical details of a solu-
tion, it is also necessary that individual stakeholders com-
mit to fulfilling their part of the implementation plan. For
example, carriers may be required to equip aircraft with
a specific technology. They can be reluctant to do so if
such equipage is not perceived as being in their benefit.
In addition, stakeholder may not want to commit to pay-
ing and carrying out their share if the benefits they are
expecting also depend that another party do the same.
There have been past examples where the FAA required
airlines to equip their aircraft but never delivered the in-
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frastructure to make the equipage beneficial or even use-
ful leading to mistrust. Commercial airlines mistrust the
FAA’s ability to deliver infrastructure following the fail-
ure of CPDLC, and general aviation has similar concerns
following the FAA’s decision to not mandate the Mode-
S transponder. These past examples are leading carriers
to question whether or not the FAA will deliver the neces-
sary infrastructure, and if it does so whether or not carriers
will truly see a benefit or if the FAA will be the only one
to see a drop in costs.
One way to get past stakeholder hesitancy is to once
again use incentives to equip or carry out whatever neces-
sary actions. Incentives can change the cost benefit struc-
ture for a stakeholder and as a result change their objec-
tives making the decision to act more in their benefit. Mit-
igation measures can also be used to help offset the effect
of costs which may disproportionately affect a subset of
stakeholders.
Mandates can also be used to move past stakeholder
barriers. This can be an effective means of bringing about
change when a stakeholder with the authority to mandate
a change exists. A mandate can clarify the details of a
transition and as a result eliminate uncertainty from the
cost-benefit analysis carried out by stakeholders. Elimi-
nating such uncertainty and clarifying benefits can make
stakeholders more willing to equip. However, in order for
a mandate to be successful, stakeholders have to trust that
the mandating party will fulfill their part of the transition.
4.4 Deliberate Blocking of Transition
Even with the use of mitigation, not all stakeholders can
be convinced to accept a change. Those stakeholders that
feel they would lose significantly by the implementation
of a proposed change have a large stake in continuing a
fight even when a decision has been agreed on by others.
Stakeholders most likely to try to block implementation
are those who were marginalized or not represented at the
original decision process or those who believe that the se-
lected solution is so negative to them that the status quo is
preferable to the change. Such stakeholders also usually
do not have the ability to unilaterally change the decision.
As a result, their objective becomes to get in the way of
implementation in the hopes of preventing implementa-
tion or maybe restarting negotiations.
Stakeholders can build support and coalitions, in some
cases attempting to involve the public or lawmakers. This
can increase the power asserted in favor of a particular so-
lution or even any solution. To do this, they need to frame
the argument in a way that gets the attention of others.
A standard framing tactic is the use of established values
that others will resonate with. In the policy arena com-
mon values used to fame disputes are equity, efficiency,
security, liberty, and community [14]. In the air trans-
portation system a powerful value is safety. Maintaining
and promoting safety has been one of the main goals of
the system since its inception and many past changes oc-
curred because of safety drivers. In particular, accidents
provide a powerful catalyzing event for change. They cre-
ate widespread awareness and engage the general public
who in turn engage legislators. Because it is such a strong
value, it can also be used to block change. All a stake-
holder needs to do is to successfully create doubts about a
proposed change’s safety and that change will be delayed
or even canceled.
The Capstone project provides an example where the
“safety veto” was used twice. In March 2006, ADS-B
returns were removed from controllers’ display screens
in the Anchorage center due to controller concerns about
discriminating between aircraft radar returns and ADS-
B equipped returns [15]. The Alaska Aviation Coordina-
tion Council, a group that represents commercial opera-
tors in the area, was concerned with the safety implica-
tions of lack of ADS-B data for controllers. Based on
these concerns, the FAA evaluated ADS-B to radar proce-
dures and returned ADS-B returns to controllers’ scopes
in May [15]. In this case, safety was used as an argument
both to oppose the specific use of ADS-B procedures and
then to reinstate them.
Another tactic for preventing or stalling change is to
argue about the validity of data, models, or predictions.
Discrediting the basis of the understanding of the prob-
lem as well as the basis for evaluating the effects of solu-
tions can stall the process or send it back to earlier stages.
This technique was used in the fight over the construction
of runway 14/32 at Logan airport in Boston: the runway
opened on Thanksgiving Day in 2006, but a series of liti-
gation between the local port authority and affected com-
munities delayed the project for 30 years [4]. The fights
focused in no small part around the assumptions made in
predicting the effects that the runway would have on local
communities.
Unfortunately, models and especially predictions al-
ways contain assumptions which can be attacked. Issues
of credible knowledge assessment becomes a powerful
tool in policy disputes. It raises the question of how ac-
curate models have to be, and also who has the credibility
use them and be believed.
When stakeholder differences become entrenched, and
a marginalized stakeholder cannot be pacified with mit-
igation, stagnation of a transition can occur. As a result,
the time to bring a change about can increase significantly.
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5 Implications of Long Implementa-
tion Time
Long implementation times can have the consequence of
rendering transition efforts irrelevant. The rapid pace of
technology development means that the next generation
solution could be developed and available before the ex-
isting solution can be implemented in the NAS. This may
force stakeholders to decide to abandon an existing sys-
tem and try to begin again with the new technology. The
problemwith such a strategy is that it can occur repeatedly
as technology development progresses and the transition
process is restarted with each new development.
An example of the effect of technological improve-
ments relates to the ADS-B dual link decision. Since the
2001 dual link decision in the US, rapid evolution in tech-
nology has undercut the assumptions in the dual-link de-
cision. 1090ES equipment can be manufactured and in-
stalled in small aircraft at a similar cost and size as UAT
equipment. Also, in-cockpit satellite-based weather ser-
vices have grown rapidly in the general aviation indus-
try, providing an alternative to the weather products pro-
vided by UAT. As a response to technological improve-
ments, a contractor has proposed a single 1090ES system
supplemented with commercial satellite-based in-cockpit
weather. This has the potential to eliminate the complex-
ity of multilink gateways in the ground infrastructure [16],
but would require revisiting approval processes.
Long implementation times can also mean that prob-
lems become moot before they are addressed because the
environment has changed or stakeholders have adapted in
a number of other small ways. Examples include the Mi-
crowave Landing System (MLS) and expansion projects
in Saint Louis (STL) where expected demand did not ma-
terialize citestl. While this can be beneficial because a
problem has been solved, it may be that small local solu-
tion have been put in place and are inefficient for the sys-
tem as a whole. Even in cases where the adaptations have
proved to be successful and efficient, a transition process
may not be halted just because the problem no longer ex-
ists. In these cases, money will still be spend on the orig-
inal attempted solution.
In the case of runway and infrastructure expansion long
implementation times mean that capacity increases are not
made in time to support demand. In such a case, manag-
ing demand will be the only option available which can be
implemented rapidly. Figure 12 shows how demand man-
agement would modify the demand input into the system
transition model. Demand management is already in place
at 4 slot restricted airports in the US. In these cases slot re-
strictions were implemented as emergency measures and
have remained in place. Recently political pressure re-
sulted in an attempt to remove restrictions at two of the
airports, but without success. As are result of slot re-
moval in 2000, LaGuradia suffered crippling delays and
slots had to be reinstated [17]. Currently, plans for how to
best distribute the limited resources at these airports in an
efficient and equitable manner are still being made.
Figure 12. Demand Management
6 Conclusions
A critical enabler to bringing about the next generation
air transportation system in the US and in Europe is the
ability to strategically and effectively transition the air
transportation system. Stakeholder opposition to change
as well as the complexities of the implementation process
both pose significant barriers to change. Effective means
of using incentives and mitigation need to be developed
in order to move past stakeholder barriers. In addition, it
is critical that efficient safety and environmental review
processes be developed in order to faster implement new
capabilities into the air transportation system.
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